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1. Introduction
The revenue and expenditure sides of public budgets are influenced by
many factors. The fiscal balance is not the result of actual government de-
cisions only. Budgetary outcomes are also dependent, among other factors,
on the business cycle, windfall revenues and demographic developments.
These factors can significantly blur the overall fiscal picture, and this is
why it is not easy to assess fiscal policy at first sight. What is the real cha-
racter of fiscal policy? Is it expansionary or restrictive? Is it pro-cyclical or
does it have stabilisation effects? To answer these questions, it is necessary
to make a comprehensive analysis of fiscal policy development, and in par-
ticular to adjust the fiscal balance for one-off revenues and expenditures
and to estimate the cyclical and structural components of the overall fiscal
balance.1
In practice, there are several methods for calculating the cyclical balance.
One of the most widely used approaches to estimating the cyclically adjus-
ted fiscal balance is the OECD’s method (Noord, 2000). The OECD has de-
veloped a technique that is internationally comparable, theoretically sound
and relatively easy to employ and interpret. This method is becoming even
more prominent because the European Commission, the most important
user of cyclically adjusted balances for the surveillance of budgetary poli-
cies, has adjusted its method to the OECD approach (European Commis-
sion, 2002). Firstly, the Commission uses the budgetary sensitivity para-
meters based on tax and expenditure elasticities calculated by the OECD.
Secondly, the Commission is moving from its method used to calculate po-
tential GDP resting on a statistical filter (Hodrick-Prescott filter) to a pro-
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1 From a theoretical point of view, one should make a clear distinction between cyclically-ad-
justed balances and structural balances. The former aims at excluding the incidence of the bu-
siness cycle only, whereas the latter may additionally correct fiscal outcomes for other non-re-
current effects. It is important to emphasise that this paper is concerned purely with the narrow
concept, as it seeks to identify the influence of the business cycle only. But as we work with
the cash fiscal balance (GFS 86 methodology), we exclude financial operations (privatisation re-
venues, lending and repayments) and cash transfers to transformation institutions from the fis-
cal balance.duction function approach. Another technique of cyclical adjustment was
developed recently within the ESCB (ECB, 2001). The aim of this paper is
to apply both the OECD and ESCB methods to Czech fiscal data and to com-
pare their results.
This paper is organised as follows. The second section concentrates on
theOECD adjustment approach. Thenext section briefly describes theESCB
technique of cyclical adjustment. In the fourth section, we compare the re-
sults of both methods applied to Czech fiscal policy and then we draw con-
clusions. There are also two appendices attached to this paper where de-
tailed information on the output gap derivation and all necessary elasticity
regression equations can be found.
2. The OECD Approach
The OECD approach involves three steps:
1. In the first step, the sensitivity of various forms of taxation and expen-
diture with respect to economic fluctuations is estimated. Before esti-
mating particular output elasticities, cyclical revenues and expenditures
have to be identified. On the revenue side, value-added tax, excises, im-
port duties, corporate income tax, personal income tax and social secu-
rity contributions were identified as sensitive to the cycle and adjusted
for the cycle. On the expenditure side, expenditures related to employ-
ment policies are considered to be the only item sensitive to the cycle.
Generally, the calculation of the respective elasticities is based on the de-
composition of the “aggregate” (or reduced-form) elasticity with respect
to GDP into the product of elasticity with respect to the relevant econo-
mic base and the relationship of the economic base and GDP.
2. Disentangling the trend and cycle of real GDP. Potential output is esti-
mated using the Cobb-Douglas production function (see Appendix 1 for
more information).
3. The output gap and the elasticities from the preceding two steps are used
to derive the cyclical component of revenues and expenditure. Combining
revenue and expenditure elasticities with the estimate of the output gap
gives the full cyclical component of the budget. The structural balance is
calculated by subtracting the cyclical component of revenues and expen-
ditures from the general government balance.
2.1 The Cyclical Sensitivity of Tax Revenues and Expenditures
The OECD approach is based on the observation that economic activity
influences tax bases (wage bill, profits, consumption, etc.) and unemploy-
ment, which in turn determine tax proceeds and public expenditure. This
finding is reflected in the way the elasticities are estimated. The “aggre-
gate” elasticity of a particular revenue and expenditure category is calcu-
lated in two steps. First, the elasticities of tax proceeds or expenditure with
respect to the relevant bases have to be determined. Most taxes are levied
advalorem, with thetax rate set as acertain per cent of thetax base. Thetax
rate is usually independent of the size of the tax base. Thus, the nature of
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ceeds and the relevant base, i.e. unit elasticity. If this assumption cannot
be applied due to progressivity of the tax or some other factor violating
the proportionality assumption, information from the tax code and additi-
onal data sources are used to extract the elasticity. Second, the regression
analysis is used to estimate the elasticities of the relevant tax bases and
unemployment with respect to cyclical economic activity, i.e. the output gap.
These two sets of elasticities are subsequently combined into reduced-form
elasticities that link the cyclical components of taxes to the output gap. Asi-
milar breakdown of the expenditure elasticity into a gauge of cyclical unem-
ployment and the sensitivity of current expenditure to cyclical unemploy-
ment has been introduced.
The two-step procedure (estimates of the cyclical sensitivity of tax bases
and estimates of the sensitivity of tax proceeds to changes in the tax base)
facilitates the economic interpretation of the elasticities. The a priori as-
sumption of unit elasticity of most tax proceeds to the tax base enables us
to avoid estimating the elasticity on the basis of regression analysis, which
often leads to biased estimates due to frequent tax law changes. To avoid
biased elasticity estimates, dummies capturing thetax law changes are usu-
ally introduced into the regression equations. In the case of the Czech Re-
public, theintroduction of dummies is complicated by thefact that theCzech
tax system has undergone too many changes with a significant impact on
tax proceeds. It is almost impossible to trace back all the changes and in-
clude them in the regression analysis. The proportionality assumption al-
lows these obstacles to be circumvented and makes the approach compar-
able across various countries. Thus, this feature can be regarded as themain
advantage of the OECD approach.2
On the other hand, based on regression analysis, the estimated cyclical
sensitivity of the tax base can reflect just the “average” cyclical responsi-
veness over the sample period. The actual year-to-year behaviour of the cy-
clical sensitivity of budget items may be more erratic, as specific tax bases
may react atypically over the cycle depending on the nature of the econo-
mic shock. By concentrating on elasticity with respect to the output gap,
the OECD approach cannot incorporate actual composition effects. If
the economic expansion is driven by private consumption, tax proceeds 
(mainly VAT and excises) are likely to increase more than in the case of eco-
nomic growth of the same magnitude fuelled by foreign demand. Composi-
tion effects can be very strong in the short term but should average out over
longer periods.
The results of elasticity estimates are summarised in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
First of all, it should be noted that the reported elasticities are to be in-
terpreted as the short-run cyclical sensitivity of the given variable. The re-
gression equations used for estimating the cyclical sensitivity of tax bases
are fully comparable to those applied by the OECD.3 All regression coeffi-
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2 This is, however, not to say that the proportionality assumption actually solves the afore-
mentioned econometric problems. The proportionality assumption may, nevertheless, serve as
a second-best solution if econometric problems prevent a reliable empirical elasticity estima-
tion.cients were statistically significant at the 5% level. Regression coefficients
which appeared implausible were replaced by calibrated values.
The row showing the derivation of the output elasticity of personal in-
come tax indicates that if output were 1 % higher, employment would in-
crease by 0.3 % (a kind of “Okun law” relationship). Thus, employment is
subject to less volatile fluctuations during the business cycle, as output vo-
latility is partially absorbed by changing labour productivity. Higher em-
ployment would exert upward pressure on the real wage rate (a sort of Phil-
lips curve relationship). In this case, an increase in employment of 1 %
would bring about a corresponding change in the real wage rate. The in-
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Notes: a Derivations of the equations used for computing “aggregate” elasticity with respect to real GDP can be
found in the technical appendix of the OECD Working Paper (Noord, 2000).
b The wage elasticity of personal income tax per worker was derived as a ratio of the statutory marginal tax
rate to the average tax rate calculated for the particular tax bracket using data from the TREXIMA spread-
sheet used by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Actually, there are four tax brackets in the Czech
PIT system and marginal rates range from 15 to 32 %. The picture is, however, significantly blurred by
the existence of several dozen exceptions, special deductible items and tax allowances.
c Regression yields a value exceeding one (1.1), which is implausible. The OECD average is 0.5. As a result,
a value of 1 has been calibrated.
d The output elasticity for corporate income tax was derived under the assumption of a strictly proportional
tax rate, such that cyclical variations in the tax yield correspond to fluctuations in the tax base. As a result,
unit elasticity has to be applied by definition.
Macroecono Elasticity Output  Employment Output  Specific 
-mic tax base with respect  elasticity of  elasticity elasticity of  assumptions
to base employment of wages tax yields
Tax category: A B C D = B.(1 + 
+ A.C)a
Personal wage  rate 2.2b 0.3 1.0c 1.0 -
income tax
Social wage  rate 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.6 -
security 
contributions
ABC D =    E
(1 – (1 – E).B.
(1 + C))/E
Corporate gross  Profit  share 
income tax operating  1.0d 0.3 1.0 1.5 in GDP =
surplus = 43 %
TABLE 1
Macroeconomic  Elasticity with  Output elasticity  Output elasticity 
tax base respect to base of tax base of tax yields
Tax category: A B C = A . B
Value-added tax Private consumption 1.0 1.0 1.0
Excises Private consumption 1.0 1.0 1.0
Import duties Imports of goods 1.0 1.5 1.5
TABLE 2
3 See P. van den Noord (OECD, 2000), Technical Appendix: “Determining the cyclical compo-
nents of budget balances”, which contains a specification of all the regression equations applied
to estimate the cyclical sensitivity of tax bases. The results for the Czech Republic are summa-
rised in the Statistical Appendix.crease in the tax base is transmitted to higher tax proceeds. The wage elas-
ticity of income tax per worker was extracted from an aggregated sample
of more than one million employees containing data on income tax paid in
a particular tax bracket.
The same procedure was used to derive the cyclical sensitivity of social
security contributions. The only difference is the proportionality assump-
tion made with respect to the wage elasticity of social security contribu-
tions, which is justified by the tax legislation – a common rate for most tax-
payers is applied. Moreover, the unit elasticity of social security contribu-
tions with respect to the wage rate was confirmed by regression analysis.
The resulting output elasticity of social security contributions (0.6) seems
to be in contradiction with the observed behaviour of the social security con-
tributions/GDP ratio. Since 1994, social security contributions as a percen-
tage of GDP have increased, with the exception of 1998, which indicates
higher-than-unit elasticity with respect to nominal GDP. However, the elas-
ticity reported here captures the sensitivity of social security contributions
to real GDP fluctuations, because this concept of elasticity is relevant for
the purposes of gauging the variations in the fiscal deficit during the cycle.
If wage increases do not fully and immediately reflect labour productivity
growth (this situation corresponds to the parameter values reported in
Table 1), the tax base may expand at a slower pace than output, which gi-
ves rise to elasticity below unity.4
Empirical studies focusing on tax elasticity estimation often find it diffi-
cult to calculate the output elasticity of corporate income tax. This results
from the legal possibility of making use of various tax shields and other
operations when determining taxable income (e.g. loss carry-over rules and
the presence of various tax incentives). In turn, the relation between cor-
porate income tax and profits (and output) is blurred.5 The OECD ap-
proach derives a relationship for the cyclical sensitivity of corporate income
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Benefit Output Employment Trend Output Output
share in  elasticity of  elasticity of  unemploy- elasticity of  elasticity of 
expenditures employment labour supply ment rate unemploy- expenditures
ment benefits
Expenditure A B C D E =  -B.((1 – F = A.E
category: – C) D – 1)
Unemploy- 0.5 % 0.3 0.0 a 6.4 % -4.4 -0.02
ment benefits
TABLE 3
Note: a Regression yields both a negative and positive value depending on the specification. It has been assumed
that labour supply does not respond to employment fluctuations.
4 This approach neglects the potential impact of the changing output gap on prices. As a result,
there is no scope for price elasticity of the tax base. If the wage rate is adjusted according to ex-
pected price inflation, it can result in the short-run price elasticity of the wage rate consider-
ably exceeding one (actual inflation turned out to be lower than expected inflation). If this is
the case, in the course of time the ratio of social security contributions to GDP can rise despite
the output elasticity of the wage rate being below one. The reason is that the inflation-driven
growth of the wage rate overcompensates for the slowly adjusting productivity component of
the wage increase.tax based on the proportionality assumption of corporate income and out-
put. The proportionality assumption implies that the tax elasticity is equal
to the elasticity of the tax base (corporate income, i.e. profits) with respect
to output. If output rises, employment changes in the same direction and
the increasing employment puts upward pressure on wages. Thus, the wage
bill rises and affects corporate profits. The impact of a growing wage bill on
the growth rate of profits depends on the value of the output elasticity of
employment and the employment elasticity of wages.6 In practice, variati-
ons in employment are less volatile than variations in output while wages
show a cyclical pattern, so the output elasticity of corporate income tax
should differ from 1 and is most probably larger than 1.
It follows from the derivation of the output elasticity of corporate income
tax that the outcome is very much dependent on the proportionality as-
sumption. The regression analysis does not support this assumption, the es-
timated elasticity being significantly lower.7 However, it should be noted
that the elasticity obtained from time series regression could be somewhat
underestimated. First, during the last decade corporate income tax (to-
gether with personal income tax) was subject to more frequent legal chan-
ges than other taxes. Second, the loss carry-over rule gives rise to non-li-
nearity, which is hard to model, and traditional regression techniques ap-
plied to the time series may lead to biased estimates. At the current stage,
theoretical derivation of the output elasticity of corporate income tax con-
ditional on the proportionality assumption seems to represent a good ap-
proximation of reality and is preferred over a purely econometric estimate.
The proportionality assumption was maintained with regard to indirect
taxes, namely value-added tax, excises and import duties. As a result, the re-
duced-form elasticity depends solely on thecyclical sensitivity of thetax base,
i.e. private consumption and imports of goods. Interpreting the short-run re-
gression coefficients, private consumption fluctuates with output, while im-
ports of goods exhibit larger fluctuations during the cycle as compared to
real GDP. As a result, the output elasticity of VAT and excises is equal to
one, and the output elasticity of import duties significantly exceeds one.
The proportionality assumption is fully warranted with respect to value-
-added tax because private consumption is a very close proxy of the tax base.
The only reason for the elasticity differing from one is the existence of two
rates. If the composition of consumption changes systematically over
the cycle (substitution between goods and services subject to different tax
rates), the elasticity can depart from the theoretical value. But regression
analysis does not provide such evidence. It is more difficult to maintain
the proportionality assumption with regard to excises. The tax base of ex-
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5 In the national accounts, corporate profit is expressed in net terms, thus allowing subtraction
of losses from profits in the given year over the economy as a whole. Contrary to that, the tax
legislation does not, of course, enable such immediate “macroeconomic” profits-losses compen-
sation when it comes to determining tax bases and paying CIT.
6 The aggregate elasticity of corporate income tax is more sensitive to changes in the output
elasticity of employment.
7 Corporate income tax was regressed on a quarterly proxy of gross operating surplus (GDP less
compensation of employees) and seasonal dummies (Q2 and Q4). The elasticity of tax proceeds
with respect to the macroeconomic base (lagged by four quarters) was equal to 0.57.cises is much narrower than aggregate private consumption, which can give
rise to an elasticity significantly different from unity.8 To make the analy-
sis comparable, unit elasticity was applied. The same qualification can be
raised in the case of import duties.9
The elasticities obtained can be used to calculate the output elasticity of
tax revenues and total revenues. The elasticity of tax (total) revenues is
equal to the weighted sum of the individual tax elasticities, with the weights
corresponding to the shares of the individual tax categories in overall tax
revenues (general government revenues). The elasticity of tax revenues
amounts to 0.91 and the elasticity of total revenues equals 0.81. If the re-
sults are compared to the elasticities reported by the OECD, social security
contributions are the only tax category with a lower elasticity (0.6) than
the OECD average (0.8). Higher elasticity was found for corporate income
tax (1.5, compared to the OECD average of 1.3) and indirect taxes (1.0 com-
pared to 0.9). The output elasticity of personal income tax was the same as
in the OECD countries (1.0).
On the expenditure side, unemployment benefits are considered the only
item sensitive to the cycle. It was assumed that unemployment benefits are
strictly proportional to unemployment. In other words, unemployment be-
nefit rates and the percentage of the unemployed entitled to receive bene-
fits (relative to all the unemployed) are seen to be independent of the cycle.
On the basis of this assumption, it is possible to decompose the output elas-
ticity of unemployment benefits into the output elasticity of employment
and the employment elasticity of labour supply. Regression analysis did not
reveal any systematic relationship between the labour force and the cycle
in the Czech Republic, which is why the employment elasticity of labour
supply was set equal to zero.10 Then the output elasticity of unemployment
benefits collapses into a simple expression containing only the trend unem-
ployment rate and the output elasticity of employment, which are weight-
ed by the share of unemployment-related expenditure in total expenditure
to obtain the output elasticity of total expenditure. The output elasticity of
unemployment benefits tells us that during a cyclical upswing employment
grows. If the labour force does not change, the number of unemployed
shrinks by the number of newly employed, but the percentage change in
the number of unemployed depends on the unemployment rate. If the pro-
portionality assumption holds, unemployment benefits change by the same
rate as the number of unemployed.
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8 Excises were regressed on real private consumption, trend and seasonal dummies (Q3). Exci-
ses represent specific taxes, which means that in the absence of tax law changes, proceeds from
excises depend on the volume of consumption only. This is why nominal quantities were re-
gressed on real quantities. However, in reality the tax levied per volume unit is regularly ad-
justed. The trend was used to capture this systematic adjustment. The regression yields elas-
ticity exceeding unity (1.1) but is reasonably close to the a priori assumption.
9 Import duties were regressed on imports of goods, the trend capturing the declining effective
tax rate as a result of trade liberalisation and a dummy variable (1996:Q3). The estimated elas-
ticity (0.83) is not that distant from the theoretical assumption.
10 Two different specifications lead to completely different elasticity estimates – with opposite
signs. The striking fact is that both parameter estimates are statistically significant (at the 10%
significance level).The output elasticity of expenditures is much lower in the Czech Repub-
lic (-0.02) than in the OECD countries (-0.3). This finding can be fully ex-
plained by the very low level of unemployment benefits in the Czech Re-
public. This reasoning is confirmed by almost the same output elasticity of
unemployment expenditures (-4.4, as compared to the OECD average of
-4.3). This comparison indicates that if the share of unemployment benefit
in expenditures were at the same level as in the OECD countries, the out-
put elasticity of expenditures would equal the OECD average.
The output elasticity of revenues and expenditures can provide a mea-
sure of the sensitivity of the budget balance to the cycle. It follows from
these elasticities that aone per cent increase in output will improve thede-
ficit-to-GDP ratio by 0.35 percentage points.11 Most of the budget sensiti-
vity is on the revenue side, while the expenditure side is almost insensi-
tive to the cycle. The corresponding number for the OECD average is 0.49.
The lower sensitivity of the budget balance in the Czech Republic results
from the very low share of unemployment benefits in expenditures and
the lower output elasticity of revenues. The lower elasticity of revenues
results from the relatively high share of social security contributions in
tax revenues and the lower cyclical sensitivity of social security contri-
butions.
3. The ESCB Approach
The foundation of the ESCB approach consists in estimating the cyclical
component of the individual revenue and expenditure items with respect to
the relevant macroeconomic bases. Contrary to the European Commission
and OECD methods, neither aggregate output nor theoutput gap play anex-
plicit role in the ESCB technique. The ESCB method calculates budgetary
elasticities with respect to less aggregated data such as private consump-
tion, the private wage bill and the number of unemployed persons. This
method thus takes into account the fact that the individual components of
aggregate demand may exhibit different trends and fluctuations, especially
in the short run. Moreover, the individual components of aggregate demand
are subject to different tax burdens. This fact further reinforces the impor-
tance of composition effects for short-term fiscal performance. Such short-
-term heterogeneity of macroeconomic components can have a sizeable ef-
fect on the respective budgetary variables.
Therefore, the main advantage of the ESCB approach as compared to
the EC and OECD methods is that it is able to reflect the “composition ef-
fect” when estimating the cyclical and structural fiscal balance. In simple
terms, this means that, for example, a 1% increase in the dynamics of real
GDP caused primarily by improved foreign demand will probably have less
of a positive impact on budgetary development than a GDP improvement
of the same order fuelled mainly by domestic demand. The composition ef-
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11 The sensitivity of the budget balance to the cycle is given by the sum of the output elasticity
of revenues and expenditures multiplied by their respective GDPratios. Strictly speaking, there-
sult represents semi-elasticity, i.e. the change in the budget balance as a percentage of GDP for
a 1% change in GDP.fect can be particularly important from the short-term point of view, where
some of the less aggregated relevant macroeconomic bases need not be in
line with aggregate output.
Another innovation of the ESCB method is that it concentrates solely on
the part of the individual revenue or expenditure categories which really
shows a cyclical character. The ESCB approach aims at avoiding the cer-
tain logical asymmetry that is present in the OECD and EC methods. In
particular, the ESCB argues that some budgetary outlays at the same time
represent budgetary revenues.12 The OECD and EC methods assume zero
elasticity of these items on the expenditure side of public budgets, whereas
on the revenue side, they are fully included in the elasticity calculations.
This must lead to biased results since each budgetary transaction should
be treated consistently at all stages of cyclical adjustment. In other words,
if we accept the hypothesis of zero elasticity of a given budgetary item on
the expenditure side, it would be a logical mistake to include the effects of
the same transaction in the cyclical adjustment on the revenue side of
the budget.
3.1 Identification of Cyclical Revenues and Their Corresponding
Bases
Firstly, it is necessary to decide which income and outlay budgetary cate-
gories show cyclical behaviour, i.e. their fluctuation is a function of the bu-
siness cycle. Tax receipts and social security contributions are usually test-
ed for cyclical behaviour. In our paper, we work with indirect taxes (VAT and
excises), direct taxes (PIT and CIT)13 and social security contributions.14 For
the purposes of our analysis, we have excluded property taxes, which do not
correspond primarily to cyclical effects. The selection of appropriate tax can-
didates was not very difficult. On the other hand, our situation was compli-
cated by the fact that, in line with the ESCB’s suggestions, we had to make
partial adjustments to the individual revenue components (details can be
found in Section 3.5). Table 4 recapitulates all cyclical budgetary revenues
together with their corresponding macroeconomic bases.15
3.2 Identification of Cyclical Expenditures and Their Relevant
Bases
The business cycle affects both the revenue and expenditure sides of
public budgets. Whereas selection of appropriate revenue categories is not
a difficult task, the situation is completely different when it comes to bud-
485 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 53, 2003, ã. 11-12
12 For example, VAT or excises paid by the state when purchasing goods and services, or perso-
nal income tax paid by government employees from their wages.
13 The abbreviations stand for personal income tax and corporate income tax.
14 Contributions for the state pension system, the unemployment scheme, sickness benefits and
the public health care system.
15 The sorting of the macroeconomic bases with the individual revenue categories fully conforms
to ECB (2001).getary expenditures. Some papers have even given up a cyclical analysis
of public outlays.16 It is generally assumed that cyclical expenditures are
outlay fluctuations that correlate with changes in unemployment. Ne-
vertheless, experience has shown that it is quite difficult to precisely iden-
tify these categories and, even more importantly, to fill them with reliable
data.
Facing these difficulties, we decided to include unemployment benefits
and state social support outlays in our analysis despite the fact that bene-
ficiaries of state social support programmes also include employed people
with a low level of wages. Another problem was how to deal with spending
on active labour market policy, since these expenditures may exhibit some
kind of cyclical behaviour. As the level of these expenditures is fully deter-
mined by a discretionary government decision, we do not include them in
the cyclical expenditure component. We also do not consider the budgetary
costs of early retirement programmes, since there are no reliable statistics
nor estimates splitting these outlays into a part “substituting” unemploy-
ment benefits and another part related rather to the personal, family and
social preferences of individuals, which are independent of the business
cycle. Table 5 provides a summary of selected expenditure items and rela-
ted macroeconomic bases.
3.3 Estimation of Revenue and Expenditure Cyclical Component
The cyclical component of the individual revenue and expenditure items
was calculated in the standard way17 as the actual nominal value of the re-
venue or expenditure item times the elasticity of that revenue/expenditure





SSC (social security contribution) Ws
TABLE 4 Cyclical Budgetary Revenues and Their Macroeconomic Bases
Note: Cs means private consumption
L employment in private sector
 s average wage in private sector
GOS gross operating surplus of firms(Gross operating surplus is a proxy for the corporate tax base. 
It was calculated as nominal GDP minus compensation of employees.)
Ws private wage bill
Unemployment benefits U
State social support benefits U
TABLE 5 Cyclical Expenditures and Corresponding Macroeconomic Bases
Note: U is the number of unemployed persons.
16 For example (Bezdûk – Král, 2001), (Krejdl – Schneider, 2000) and also partially (EC, 2000
and 2001).category to its macroeconomic base times the percentage “gap” between















t captures the actual (nominal) value of that budgetary item,
εBj,Mj represents the elasticity of the budgetary item with respect to its
macroeconomic base,
t means the time index,
m
j
c,t stands for the cyclical component of the corresponding macroecono-













tr,t, is the trend value of the given base in real terms,
M
j
t measures the actual value of that base in real
terms.
Equation (1) was applied to the individual revenue and expenditure ca-
tegories in the following way:
Cyclical component of VAT:
VATc,s,t =V A T s,t . εVATs,Cs . cs,t (3)
where:
VATs,t is the value added tax income paid by the private sector,
VATc,s,t means the cyclical part of that revenue item,
εVATs,Cs captures the elasticity of “private” VAT to private consumption,
cs,t measures the relative (in % terms) private consumption “gap”,
s stands for seasonally adjusted data, since all revenue elasticities
have been regressed on quarterly data.
Cyclical component of excises:
EXc,s,t =E X s,t . εEXs,Cs . cs,t (4)
where:
EXs,t is the amount of excise tax collected from private sector taxpayers,
EXc,s,t represents the cyclical part of such defined revenues,
εEXs,Cs measures the elasticity of “private” excises to private consumption.
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17 Exactly the same equation as (1) was applied in the OECD approach to derive the cyclical tax
revenues, but   stands for the elasticity of revenues with respect to the output gap and the gap
in the macroeconomic base (m) is replaced by the output gap.Cyclical component of PIT:
PITc,s,t = PITs,t . (εPITs,ω . (ws,t – es,t) + 1 . es,t) (5)
where:
PITs,t is the amount of personal income tax collected from private sector
employees,
PITc,s,t stands for the cyclical component of the revenues,
εPITs,ω measures the elasticity of “private” PIT with respect to the average
private sector wage,
ws,t means the “gap” in the real private sector wage bill, and finally,
es,t captures the “gap” in private sector employment.
Cyclical component of social security and health care contributions:
SSCc,s,t = SSCs,t . εSSCs,Ws . ws,t (6)
where:
SSCs,t represents the total amount of social security and health contribu-
tions paid by private sector employees,
SSCc,s,t measures the cyclical component of that budgetary income,
εSSCs,Ws captures the elasticity of “private” contributions to the private sec-
tor wage bill,
ws,t is the “gap” in the real private sector wage bill.
Cyclical component of CIT:
CITc,s,t = CITc,t . εCITs,GOSs . goss,t (7)
where:
CITs,t means corporate income tax revenues,
CITc,s,t is the cyclical component of that budgetary income,
εCIT,GOS represents the elasticity of CIT to gross operating surplus,
gost measures the “gap” in gross operating surplus.
Cyclical component of unemployment-related outlays:
EXPc,t = EXPt . εEXP,U . ut (8)
where:
EXPt means the actual amount of these expenditures (on an annual ba-
sis),
EXPc,t is the cyclical part of unemployment-related outlays,
εEXP,U measures the elasticity of those expenditures to the number of
unemployed persons,
ut captures the “gap” in the number of unemployed persons.
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A Hodrick-Prescott filtering technique was employed to get estimates of
the trend levels of all the relevant macroeconomic bases.18 A great advan-
tage of this econometric method is undoubtedly its “user friendly” features
and low data requirements. It is a technical filtering method for smoothing
actual data to get a trend, the elasticity of which depends strongly on set-
ting the λ parameter. This method gives biased results if the given time se-
ries exhibits sudden structural breaks. In such a situation, the structural
break affects the cyclical component of the previous and following observa-
tions. This problem can be partially mitigated by choosing lower values 
of λ. Such a solution was also adopted in the ESCB (ECB, 2001)19, and we
have followed a similar method. Due to the limitations of time series length
and availability, we have to use data on a quarterly basis. Therefore, we
chose λ equal to 480 (instead of the “classical” 1600 for quarterly data),
which corresponds to λ = 30 in the case of annual data. We also tested
the sensitivity of our results to the value of λ, and certain differences were
identified at both edges of the time series. We prolonged all the time series
up to 2006 to partially eliminate problems with the trend values at the end
of the analysed period, which is defined as 1994 to 200320. The resulted gaps
are summarised by Figure 1.
3.5 Estimation of Budgetary Elasticities
Two methods were applied to derive individual budgetary elasticities. We
mainly employed a regression analysis (in logarithm terms), which directly
gives estimates of elasticities.21 In the case of PIT, we chose a different me-
thod, since we used detailed data on thecomposition of thetax burden accor-
ding to individual tax brackets.22 The elasticity is then defined as a weight-
ed average of the marginal tax rate expressed as a share in the average tax
rate for all tax brackets. The weights are the personal income tax paid in
the relevant tax bracket. We did not estimate the PIT elasticity to the num-
ber of employed persons, since we accepted an assumption of unit elasti-
city.23
As was mentioned earlier, prior to the elasticity estimation itself it was
necessary to adjust the revenue data. In the case of VAT, we adjusted it
using a proxy variable24 for that part of income which is related to govern-
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18 For more details on the HP filtering technique, see, for example, (Hodrick – Prescott, 1980)
or (Canova, 1994).
19 Instead of a generally suggested value of 100 for annual data, ESCB experts used   equal
to 30. This choice stemmed from a detailed analysis of the “reasonable” length of the business
cycle over which budgets should be balanced.
20 All elasticities were estimated on a data sample ranging from 1994:Q1 to 2002:Q3.
21 Detailed results are provided in the statistical appendix.
22 The data stem from the Trexima database, which was created for the purposes of the Minist-
ry of Labour and Social Affairs.
23 Both the different methods of elasticity derivations as well as the assumption of unit PIT elas-
ticity to the number of unemployed have also been used by the ESCB (ECB, 2001).ment purchases of goods and services. The same approach was followed in
the case of excises. PIT was first of all decreased for its withholding com-
ponents25 that do not depend on the chosen tax base.26 Then we needed
again a proxy variable27 to detect, and in next step, deduct the “government”
part of PIT from total collected PIT. The same approach was chosen for so-
cial security and health contributions. CIT was not adjusted at all.
The estimated elasticities were confronted with theoretical assumptions
as well as international empirical counterparts. Theelasticity28tells us what
on average will be the reaction (in percentage points) of a given budgetary
item to a 1% change in its relevant macroeconomic base. Our results are
summarised in the Table 6.
Czech VAT has a standard (22 %) and a reduced (5 %) tax rate. Our elas-
ticity is slightly lower than we would expect (approximately unit elasticity).
This might be the result of price elasticity of the tax base.29 In the case of
excises, the resulting elasticity is in line with our assumptions, since tax
proceeds should depend on the volume of real consumption only.30 Taking
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FIGURE 1 Gaps in the Relevant Macroeconomic Variables
(in %)
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24 The relevant proxy variable is defined as the percentage share of government consumption
in total final consumption.
25 withholding tax on deposit interest and dividends
26 In the case of withholding tax on dividends, we assume dividend-smoothing behaviour by com-
panies, which negates the cyclical nature of dividends.
27 percentage share of government wage bill in total wage bill for the whole economy
28 In our case, it involves more “reactivity”, since, due to the relatively short time series, we are
not able to eliminate the bias of estimates caused by too many changes to the Czech tax codes
since the mid-1990s.both indirect taxes together, the overall weighted indirect tax elasticity
would amount to about 0.84. This value is close to the middle of the EU-15
interval.
Social security and health care contributions are characterised by a li-
near rate (35 % of the gross wage for social security and 12.5 % for health
contributions). Therefore, one can assume unit elasticity, and this is also
confirmed by the regression equation. On the other hand, we have to men-
tion that our approach to elasticity derivation assumes implicitly no space
for the potential price effect on social and health contribution proceeds.
The method of extracting the PIT elasticity has already been explained
above. Our result seems quite high, since a higher value in the EU can only
be found in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, we do not consider the Czech
value to be unrealistic. In the ESCB paper, half of the EU countries were
treated in the same way as we treated them, and in the other half of the ca-
ses, the authors preferred an econometric approach to estimating PIT elas-
ticity. For those countries in which the non-econometric approach was used,
the PIT elasticities were relatively high.
It is generally accepted that CIT is somewhat difficult in nature since its
structure and legal arrangements are very complicated.31 We used gross
operating surplus as a proxy for the aggregate CIT base, and we included
weighted lagged variables (from one to four quarters) in theregression equa-
tion. It is necessary to bear in mind that the Czech elasticity is extremely
low from an international perspective. On the other hand, even such a re-
sult undoubtedly represents significant progress, since previous attempts
at cyclical adjustment applied to the Czech fiscal system tended to com-
pletely exclude this kind of government income from the cyclical analysis
due to the above-mentioned practical difficulties.
491 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 53, 2003, ã. 11-12
TABLE 6 Estimated Revenue and Expenditure Elasticities
Czech Republic Average of EU–15
(min. – max.)
εVATs,Cs 0.77 0.99 (0.69 – 1.21)
εEXs,Cs 0.98
εSSCs,Ws 1.03 0.99 (0.89 – 1.00)
εPITs,ω 2.2 1.55 (1.20 – 2.60)
εCIT,GOS 0.44 1.18 (0.72 – 1.50)
εEXP ,U 0.78 0.88 (0.20 – 1.07)
Source: Authors’ own calculations and ECB (2001)
29 Regressing VAT on nominal private consumption produced practically unit elasticity. This
suggests that prices may be correlated with the business cycle, which may, in turn, bias the es-
timates based on the real tax base terms. However, applying unit elasticity would have only
a negligible impact on the overall cyclical balance. Even so, the area of potential price effects
definitely remains open for further comprehensive research.
30 However, we should be aware of the fact that in practice the tax base for excise taxes is nar-
rower than total private consumption.
31 For example, the law enables a decrease in the actual tax base for losses from the past seven
years. There are many tax base deductible items in the law, and so on.The expenditure elasticity to unemployment is almost at the same level
as the European average. What is striking is the width of the range be-
tween the lowest and highest European values. We understand this as in-
direct evidence of all the difficulties connected with estimating that elasti-
city.32 Luckily, the weight of the expenditure component in the total cyclical
balance is, as documented later, very small, or even negligible, and this is
in line with the evidence for the majority of the European countries. The-
refore, the potential uncertainty on the expenditure side of the cyclical ba-
lance cannot create any significant bias for the overall cyclical balance.
3.6 Cyclical Fiscal Balance
The cyclical fiscal balance is the sum of its revenue and expenditure com-
ponents. Figure 2 demonstrates that the weight of the revenue component
dominates its expenditure counterpart.
It is quite interesting to look at the cyclical fiscal balance in more detail
and to compare explicitly the results provided by each method, i.e. by
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FIGURE 2 Cyclical Balance and Its Revenue and Expenditure Components (% of GDP)




































32 The first problem comes when selecting the appropriate expenditures (and then having reli-
able data), which should react to the business cycle. On top of that, the calculation of this elas-
ticity itself is no easy task at all. However, the width of the “European” range is partially due
to an extremely low Greek outlier.the OECD and ESCB techniques. This is done in the Figure 3. Generally
speaking, both methods deliver very similar estimates of the cyclical ba-
lance, ranging between –0.8 % and +0.8 % of GDP depending on the phase
of the business cycle. Nevertheless, certain deviations can be identified in
three particular years – 1995, 1997 and 2001. Those years might be real
candidates for the composition effect that was described earlier.
To test this hypothesis we decided to re-calculate the “ESCB” cyclical ba-
lance figures using the “OECD” estimated elasticities.33 Such a process ma-
kes it possible to adjust the above discrepancy for the impact of the diffe-
rent elasticities used in the two calculation approaches. The results are
summarised in Table 7.
It is obvious that the composition effect has been proven in all three ca-
ses. Changing the “ESCB” derived elasticities with their “OECD” based
counterparts showed only a very limited, in fact insignificant, impact on
the cyclical balance estimates. The difference in cyclical balances thus can-
not be attributed to the role of different elasticities.34
4. The Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal Balance According to the OECD
and ESCB Methods
Due to the existence of automatic fiscal stabilisers, i.e. taxes and expen-
ditures automatically changing with the level of economic activity, budge-
tary balances respond to cyclical fluctuations in economic activity. The cyc-
lical component, or the extent to which automatic fiscal stabilisers affect
general government revenues, expenditures and consequently the overall
balance, depends on many factors. The most important factors are the size
of the general government sector, the tax structure (share of individual ta-
xes in total revenues), progressivity of taxes and generosity of unemploy-
ment benefits. The output elasticity of various taxes and unemployment be-
nefits reflecting the structural parameters of the economy is another im-
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(% of GDP) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
“ESCB” –0.50 –0.12 0.82 0.80 –0.40 –0.40 –0.39 –0.24 0.23 0.28
elasticities
“OECD” –0.52 –0.08 0.88 0.79 –0.40 –0.43 –0.43 –0.25 0.29 0.27
elasticities
Difference 0.02 –0.04 –0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01 –0.06 0.01
TABLE 7 “ESCB” Cyclical Balance with Respect to Employed Elasticities
Source: authors’ own calculations
33 In fact we replaced the elasticities reported in Table 6 with those from Table 1 (column “elas-
ticity with respect to base”).
34 The variations in cyclical balances cannot be explained by the different treatment of budge-
tary revenues and expenditures in the ESCB and OECD techniques either. If we allowed
the ESCB technique not to avoid the logical asymmetry (see Section 3 for more details) as was
practised in fact in the OECD approach, the “ESCB” cyclical balance would tend to be higher
on average. This would further increase, not decrease, the difference between the “ESCB” and
“OECD” cyclical balances in 1995 and 1997. In 2001 the impact would be roughly zero.portant factor determining the size of automatic fiscal stabilisers. The size
of automatic fiscal stabilisers in the Czech Republic was estimated to be
0.35.35 An increase in output by one percentage point will, on average, im-
prove the budget balance by 0.35 % of GDP. Deviations of actual GDP from
its potential level result in cyclical surplus or deficit.
Knowledge of the cyclical balance enables us to calculate the cyclically
adjusted or structural balance. The structural balance is calculated by sub-
tracting the cyclical component of revenues and expenditures from the ac-
tual balance. The structural balance is used to assess the fiscal position.
Firstly, the structural balance shows what part of the actual balance is in-
dependent of the economic cycle. Large structural deficits indicate unsus-
tainable fiscal policy and call for fiscal consolidation. Secondly, the change
in the structural primary balance, i.e. the fiscal stance, is a measure of how
many resources, for reasons unrelated to the economic cycle, are added to
or withdrawn from the economy through the general government. Achange
in the structural primary balance approximates the discretionary fiscal po-
licy pursued by the government. A rise (fall) in the cyclically adjusted defi-
cit has expansionary (contractionary) effects, which may support or dam-
pen the effects of automatic fiscal stabilisers, depending on the phase of
the economic cycle.
The structural primary balance is defined as thedifference between theto-
tal primary fiscal balance and the cyclical balance. For the purposes of our
analysis, we have used the GFS (Government Financial Statistics advoca-
ted by the IMF) cash primary balance adjusted for net lending36 and sub-
sidies to transformation agencies, which do not fuel primary demand pres-
sures.37 The fiscal balance defined in that way can be used, with a certain
degree of tolerance, as an easily available proxy for fiscal balance based on
accrual principles. The results are summarised in Figure 4 and 6.
CAPB = PB – CB (9)
where:
CAPB stands for the cyclically adjusted (structural) primary balance,
PB means the actual primary fiscal balance (adjusted for net lending
and subsidies to transformation institutions),
CB captures the cyclical fiscal balance.
4.1 Cyclical Analysis of the “Official” Fiscal Policy
It is evident from Figure 4 that the Czech fiscal position has been sharply
deteriorating since 1998. Whereas in 1998 the fiscal authorities could re-
port a structural primary surplus, four years later the cyclically adjusted
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35 based on the OECD approach
36 Affected mainly by privatisation revenues. Those incomes have a one-off unrepeatable cha-
racter and hence should not be accounted for as a standard fiscal revenue.
37 More details about transformation institutions can be found in the first section of this fiscal
research project (“The Effect of Off-Budget Transactions on Czech Fiscal Policy”).primary balance was in deficit by over 3 % of GDP. The budget programme
for 2003 indicates a further deterioration of the structural deficit to over
5%   of GDP. When taking into account interest payments, the structural de-
ficit approached the level of 4 % of GDP in 2002 and 6 % in 2003. The two
methods, as documented by the chart below, give us quite stable estimates
of the structural deficit for the Czech Republic. The only exceptions seem
to be 1995 and 1997, which will be discussed later in more detail.
From the point of view of economic policy it is interesting to investigate
to what extent fiscal policy was counter- or pro-cyclical. Based on Figure 5
we can argue that in the past fiscal policy did not fulfil its stabilisation role,
at least when viewed from a Keynesian perspective.
Figure 5 shows the fiscal stance and output gaps. Expansionary, discre-
tionary fiscal policy is characterised by a deteriorating primary structural
balance, which is reflected by positive signs for the fiscal stance. If the bar
plotting the fiscal stance is located above the zero line, the government
pursued expansionary fiscal policy. On the contrary, if the fiscal stance
turns out to be negative, discretionary fiscal policy was restrictive. It can
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FIGURE 4 The Primary Fiscal Balance in the Czech Republic from 1994 to 2003 (as % of GDP)
and the Structural Primary Balance Extracted by the OECD and ESCB Methods
FIGURE 5 The Fiscal Stance and the Output Gap
(%; % of potential GDP)
Note: The output gap is based on the OECD production function approach.
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Primary balancebe observed from the chart that there have been only two episodes of re-
strictive fiscal policy during the last eight years. The restrictive fiscal po-
licies of 1997 and 1998 coincided with the beginning of the 1997 recession.38
The sign of the output gap indicates the phase of the economic cycle. In
1994, after a recession related to the economic transformation, the Czech
economy entered a cyclical upswing lasting until 1997. Mounting external
imbalances – specifically a current account deficit and outflow of foreign
capital – triggered the 1997 recession. Economic growth recovered in 1999,
but it took the Czech economy another two years to get to the path of po-
tential output.
A comparison of the fiscal stance and output gaps enables us to judge to
what extent the government aimed at stabilising the economy. If the fiscal
stance is of the opposite sign as the output gap, the fiscal authorities pur-
sued a counter-cyclical fiscal policy and discretionary fiscal policy strength-
ened the effects of the automatic fiscal stabilisers. On the basis of the OECD
methodology, it can be claimed that fiscal policy in the Czech Republic was
pro-cyclical in all but two years. In 1995 and 1996, the fiscal authorities
pursued an expansionary policy in spite of the fact that the Czech economy
was growing, output exceeded its potential level and the current account
deficit was deteriorating. Cyclical surpluses were put back into theeconomy,
and discretionary policy measures destabilised economic development. Af-
ter the external imbalances pushed the economy into recession, the go-
vernment introduced strict budgetary saving measures. Nevertheless, these
measures came too late. Instead of having slowed down the economy before
the external imbalances started to jeopardise economic growth, these me-
asures contributed to deepening the recession in the wake of currency cri-
ses. From 1999 on, fiscal policy has changed and has been aimed at ex-
panding aggregate demand in a period with a negative output gap. As
a result, fiscal policy in 1999 and 2000 was counter-cyclical and stabilised
the economy. Despite relatively strong economic growth, fiscal policy conti-
nued to expand aggregate demand even after 2001. Fiscal policy again be-
came pro-cyclical.
Given the results of the OECD and ESCB methods, we can conclude that
the estimated fiscal stance seems to be generally quite stable and inde-
pendent of the preferred approach. Nevertheless, we can identify two epi-
sodes with slightly different results. The first one is 1995. The OECD esti-
mate signals that fiscal policy in 1995 was strongly expansionary and
worsened the structural primary deficit, which was clearly unwarranted gi-
ven the (autonomously) strong economic performance at that time. Fiscal
policy in 1995 was, therefore, previously assessed as pro-cyclical. The ESCB
approach, on the other hand, points to an almost neutral assessment, since
it states that in 1995 we experienced only a slight increase in the structu-
ral primary deficit. The reason for such a difference stems, of course, from
the different estimation of the cyclical balance. The OECD method, based
on the overall output gap, expected a cyclical surplus of 0.5 % of GDP, be-
cause the economy seemed to be far above potential output. Contrary to
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38 The ESCB method detects fiscal restriction only in 1998, but this is much stronger than that
found using the OECD approach.that, in the case of the ESCB approach, the two most important macroeco-
nomic bases (e.g. private consumption and the private wage bill) were still
below their trend levels in 1995, and that is why this method allowed for
an overall cyclical deficit of 0.1 % of GDP.
Another interesting year is 1997. This is the only year when the two me-
thods resulted in estimates with opposite signs. According to the OECD ap-
proach, fiscal policy started relatively strong restriction as a result of two
budgetary cuts implemented in spring 1997. Due to the onset of the reces-
sion, we again started speaking about pro-cyclical fiscal policy. However,
theESCB method suggests that thefiscal stance was rather neutral. Thedif-
ference can be explained by the composition effect again. In 1997, both pri-
vate consumption and the private wage bill still quite strongly exceeded
their trend levels (by 2–3 %), and by much more than was the overall posi-
tive output gap (about 0.5 %). Therefore, according to the ESCB method,
the cyclical fiscal surplus should have reached 0.8 % of GDP. The OECD
approach, however, led to a surplus of “only” 0.1 % of GDP. The positive fiscal
stance (the ESCB approach) in 1997 was fully compensated for a year later
when discretionary fiscal restriction was much stronger based on the ESCB
technique than on the OECD approach.
4.2 Cyclical Analysis of Fiscal Policy Including the Indirect Fiscal
Deficit
The Czech fiscal system suffers, inter alia, from low transparency. This
is a consequence of the existence of “transformation institutions” (the most
important of which being the Czech Consolidation Agency, âeská finanãní
and âeská inkasní), which have been used by the government for fiscal and
quasi-fiscal purposes,39 reflecting especially banking sector stabilisation
and corporate sector restructuring. This sub-section aims to put the “offi-
cial” and indirect deficits together and analyse the overall fiscal stance, re-
flecting the full range of budgetary and off-budgetary government policy.
Nevertheless, we have to mention that the estimate of the indirect deficit
is surrounded by significant margins of uncertainty. As a result, we present
the following paragraphs to complement the above results rather than to
substitute for them.40 The Figure 6 shows the primary fiscal balance inclu-
ding the off-budget costs and its structural component based on the OECD
and ESCB methods.
Adding the indirect deficit to the “official” primary fiscal balance turns
the overall primary balance into deficits in all years but 1995. The effect of
off-budget transactions has been quite significant since 1997. From 1997 to
2000, it amounted to about 2 % of GDP per year on average, whereas from
1994 to 1996 it was less than half a percentage point per year. Figure 7 pre-
sents the fiscal stance based on these estimates of the structural deficits.
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39 More details about transformation institutions can be found in the first section of this fiscal
research project (“The Effect of Off-Budget Transactions on Czech Fiscal Policy”).
40 Moreover, due to limited data availability we are able to estimate the indirect deficit from
1994 to 2000 only.The output gap is the same as in Figure 5 and is based on the production
function approach.
The fiscal stance is clearly affected by our decision also to reflect the es-
timation of the off-budgetary deficit. First of all, in 1995, the extent of dis-
cretionary fiscal policy is definitely lower when compared to that in Figure5,
and fiscal policy may even have pursued an active counter-cyclical path, as
is signalled by the ESCB approach. Another change is apparent in 1997,
when the costs of the banking sector crisis, in particular, pushed the over-
all fiscal deficit up and fiscal policy therefore had an expansionary charac-
ter instead of being restrictive or neutral as was the case in Figure 5. Also
in 1998, the banking sector restructuring outlays overrode the fiscal re-
striction in the “official” parts of the general government, which was de-
tected above. Contrary to our previous analysis, the off-budget costs indi-
cate that the fiscal expansion was delayed by one year and started in 2000
instead of 1999. It is beyond the timeframe of this chart, but we can assume
that the fiscal expansion continued after 2000, because both the “official”
and indirect components of the overall fiscal deficit continued to grow.
One can argue that adding the indirect deficits to our analysis created
a more favourable picture of the macroeconomic management of fiscal po-
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FIGURE 6 Primary Fiscal Balance Including the Indirect Deficit and Its Structural Component
According to the OECD and ESCB Methods
(as % of GDP)
FIGURE 7 Fiscal Stance Including Off-budget Outlays and the Output Gap
(%; % of potential GDP)
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in 1995 and 1998 when compared to our previous conclusions. On the other
hand, we have identified more pro-cyclical features in 1997 and no counter-
-cyclical properties in 1999, when the economic crisis bottomed out. There-
fore, in a nutshell, we lack enough empirical support not to accuse fiscal po-
licy of overall macroeconomic mismanagement. Moreover, the analysis of
the indirect deficit reveals that the overall level of fiscal deficits has been
much higher than the officially reported figures, on average by about 2 %
of GDP in the past few years. This large total fiscal imbalance (more than
5%   of GDP in 2000 and probably 6–7 % of GDP in 2001 and 200241) will
prevent the government from pursuing an active counter-cyclical fiscal po-
licy in the event of a future economic slowdown, when it might be generally
accepted and most needed. On the contrary, if the government does not im-
mediately start a comprehensive fiscal overhaul of both the “official” and
off-budget fiscal sectors, the risk of unwarranted pro-cyclical fiscal policy
in a time of weak economic performance, reinforced by the financial mar-
kets, will sharply rise.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to apply two different approaches to the cycli-
cal adjustment of theCzech fiscal balance and to compare and discuss there-
sults obtained. The OECD approach was presented as a theoretically sound
method that should become a part of economists’ toolkit for assessing fiscal
policy. In the past, the Czech National Bank and the Czech Ministry of Fi-
nance based their approach to cyclical adjustment on an approach similar
to the one used by the European Commission – potential output extracted
by statistical filters and tax elasticities derived directly from time series
analysis. In the meantime, the EC has changed its approach and now uses
a method that is much closer to the OECD methodology.
The novelty of the OECD approach rests on the consistent decomposition
of the aggregate output elasticity of individual taxes. This approach is more
theoretically appealing than the direct derivation of GDP elasticities from
time series. Moreover, in the latter approach, pursued in the past by both
the Czech National Bank and the Ministry of Finance, nominal budget va-
riables are regressed on nominal GDP, implying an implicit assumption of
the same price and output elasticity. In theory, there is no reason to assume
identical price and output elasticity of the tax base. There are only a few
taxes where this assumption can be maintained (e.g. VAT).
Recently, another “competing” approach to cyclical adjustment has been
developed within the ESCB (ECB 2001). The OECD and ESCB methodolo-
gies are relatively comparable, because both of them explicitly incorporate
the elasticities of the individual tax categories with respect to their (mac-
roeconomic) tax bases. In principle, the same set of elasticities can be used
in the approaches of the ESCB and the OECD. Nevertheless, there are two
499 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 53, 2003, ã. 11-12
41 This is a kind of “rule of thumb” estimate, since data enabling calculation of the indirect de-
ficit are not available.major differences between the aforementioned approaches. First, the ESCB
approach puts more emphasis on econometric techniques in deriving
the elasticity of the individual tax categories with respect to their tax ba-
ses. Second, the ESCB approach does not require the establishing of a rela-
tionship between the tax base and output. Instead of calculating the out-
put elasticity of taxes and expenditure, the trend component of the mac-
roeconomic bases is extracted from time series and the estimated elasticity
is applied directly to the cyclical component of the base. Thus, the ESCB
approach is capable of taking into account the composition of economic
growth and its impact on tax revenues, but at the cost of relying on statis-
tical filters to determine the trend component of the base rather than on
economic theory.42 Moreover, the ESCB method strictly adjusts budgetary
revenues for the influence of government expenditures.
There are two crucial messages resulting from this paper. Firstly, the fact
that applying even a philosophically somewhat different methodology does
not change the basic assessment of Czech fiscal policy is of particular im-
portance: the sharply deteriorating fiscal position that we have been wit-
nessing for the past few years is structural in nature (i.e. independent of
the business cycle). Contemporary Czech fiscal policy is, therefore, following
an unsustainable path over the long run. Also, another hypothesis was
strongly confirmed: Czech fiscal policy has been exhibiting mainly pro-cyc-
lical features.
The composition effect did not change theoverall results, but played anim-
portant role in the short run, especially in 1995 and 1997, which are cha-
racterised, according to the ESCB technique, by a lower level of fiscal dis-
cretion than is estimated within theOECD analytical framework. TheESCB
method suggests that in 1995 fiscal policy was almost neutral instead of be-
ing strongly expansionary, and in 1997 it was neutral instead of being re-
strictive. The role of the composition effect was extremely important in both
years, since it reversed the sign of the fiscal stance. In spring 1997, the go-
vernment adopted two fiscal consolidation packages that, besides public in-
vestment outlays, were targeted mainly at government consumption ex-
penditure and the public sector wage bill. The OECD approach accounted
for this restriction already in 1997. However, according to the ESCB ap-
proach, the cyclical balance is only estimated for the part of budgetary re-
venues and expenditures which relates to private sector economic develop-
ment. The real effects of that fiscal restriction on the private segment of
the economy were, in fact, delayed by several quarters.
Including the estimates of indirect fiscal deficits in our analysis has par-
tially modified our thoughts about the level and timing of the fiscal stance.
What is particularly striking is the fact that accounting for quasi-fiscal ope-
rations would completely “erase” the fiscal restriction of 1997–1998 identi-
fied in the “official” part of the public budgets. Nevertheless, we argue that
even in this case fiscal policy would keep its unwarranted pro-cyclical fea-
tures. Moreover, assessing the “full range” of fiscal policy leads us to think
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42 However, it is apparent from Appendix 1 that the OECD approach to estimating potential
output is not protected from the use of statistical filters. An HPfilter was used to derive the trend
total factor productivity, trend participation rate and filtered NAWRU.that Czech fiscal policy faces much deeper and more dangerous structural
problems and without significant systematic consolidation will clearly fol-
low an unsustainable path in the medium and long term.
When reading the paper and interpreting the results, it should be re-
membered that a standard approach was applied to non-standard time se-
ries. Time series in the Czech Republic are very short, which requires wor-
king with quarterly data. But quarterly data are subject to many metho-
dological changes (and even to changing seasonality, for reasons unrelated
to underlying economic processes). The unavailability of some time series,
namely the division of quarterly data into the government and business sec-
tor, prevented us from following the OECD methodology as closely as we ori-
ginally intended. Similar problems were identified in the case of the ESCB
approach, and we sometimes had to use proxy variables or accept certain
simplifying assumptions.43 On top of that, quarterly fiscal data are not pub-
lished by the Czech statistical authority, and cash data had to be used in-
stead of accruals when checking the consistency of the theoretical assump-
tions on tax elasticities with the data. As a result, it goes without saying
that our estimates are surrounded by significant margins of uncertainty
and are likely to be subject to future revisions and refinement.
APPENDIX 1
The Production Function Approach 
to Estimating the Output Gap
The OECD approach to potential output estimation rests on a production func-
tion framework. The main advantage of the production function framework is a clear
link to economic theory, which allows an understanding of the driving forces behind
the path of potential output. From the different types of production function, a Cobb-
-Douglas production function was chosen owing to its reasonable simplicity and
transparency. In a production function framework, the potential output of an eco-
nomy depends on its endowment with factors of production (i.e. capital and labour)
and the efficiency and utilisation of the factors of production summarised by total
factor productivity.
At wo-factor Cobb-Douglas production function for the whole economy was used
(OECD 1995), taking the form:
Y = TFP . L
α . K
(1-α) (10)
where:  Y = value added
L = actual labour input
K = actual capital stock
TPF = total factor productivity
α = average labour share
Or in natural logarithms:
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43 This was especially the case with wage bill data and the adjustment of tax receipts for go-
vernment expenditures.lnY = ln TFP + α lnL + (1 – α ) lnK (11)
However, it should be noted that in the OECD approach, the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function is strictly applied to the business sector only. Due to data avail-
ability, such a distinction cannot be made in the Czech Republic.
Equation 11 (or 10) is used to derive total factor productivity in the whole eco-
nomy by substituting observable variables into the equation and calculating TFP
as a residual. The short time series in the Czech Republic do not make it possible
to work with yearly data, which is why the estimation was carried out on seasonally
adjusted quarterly data. In some cases, the quarterly data published by the Czech
statistical authority are not sufficient. As a result, some variables in the production
function, namely the capital stock, had to be replaced by proxy variables. A time se-
ries of the capital stock, K, was derived as total fixed assets reported at the end of
1995 plus gross fixed capital formation minus depreciation. The labour share, α,
was set equal to 0.52, which corresponds to the average labour share in output mea-
sured by the ratio of compensation of employees to the sum of compensation of em-
ployees and gross operating surplus.44
Potential output is calculated by combining trend total factor productivity with
the actual capital stock and an estimate of potential employment, using the same
production function.
lnYPOT = lnTFPPOT + α lnLPOT + (1 – α ) lnK (12)
Trend factor productivity (TFPPOT) was obtained by smoothing total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP). The Hodrick-Prescott filter was used to smooth the TFP time se-
ries. The level of potential employment (LPOT) can be calculated as:
LPOT = PARTPOT . POP . (1–NAWRU) (13)
where: PARTPOT = trend participation rate
POP = working age population
NAWRU = estimated non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment
The identification of an appropriate measure of NAWRU under the conditions of
a transforming economy is a very difficult task. The OECD approach identifies
the NAWRU by assuming that the change in money wage growth is proportional to
the gap between actual unemployment and the NAWRU, thus:
∆wg = –a . (U – NAWRU) a > 0 (14)
where wg = ∆w denotes money wage growth. The equation states that money wage
growth rises if and only if unemployment is below its equilibrium level. Further as-
suming that the NAWRU is unchanged between two consecutive observations,
the above equation can be differentiated, and setting ∆NAWRU = 0 yields:
∆2wg
a = – ––––– (15)
∆U
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44 Thus, the profit share (measured by gross operating surplus) amounts to 0.48, which differs
from the corresponding number in Table 1 (0.43). The difference results from another variable
used in the denominator (GDP vis-à-vis the sum of gross operating profit and compensation of
employees).Substituting a back into the original equation (14), the NAWRU can be calcula-
ted as a function of observables:
∆U
NAWRU = U – ––––– . ∆wg (16)
∆2wg
The NAWRU estimates obtained from equation 16 are usually very volatile, so
published NAWRUs are based on Hodrick-Prescott filtering of these raw NAWRU
estimates. These NAWRU estimates are then interpreted as a short-run concept of
the equilibrium rate of unemployment, aimed at measuring the rate of unemploy-
ment at which the money wage growth rate is stable. However, an empirical inves-
tigation reveals that such NAWRUs have very little power in predicting money wage
growth, as they neglect other explanatory variables, e.g. formation of inflation ex-
pectations, the level of labour share in output and the development of labour pro-
ductivity (Holden – Nymoen, 2002). To make the NAWRU concept more realistic for
the conditions in a transition economy where labour productivity has been under-
going rapid change, the following specification is assumed (Haksar, 1999):
wg – πe – lpe = –c . (U – NAWRU) c > 0 (17)
where πe is expected inflation and lpe is expected labour productivity growth. Equa-
tion 8 states that real wage growth in excess of productivity growth is the result of
a tight labour market (U<N A W R U ). Assuming simple adaptive expectations such
that πe = πt-1, lpe =l p t-1 and that the NAWRU is unchanged between two consecutive
observations, the NAWRU can be expressed as:
∆U
NAWRU = U – ––––––––––––––––– . (wg –  t–1 – lpt–1) (18)
∆(wg –  t–1 – lpt–1)
All variables are growth rates over a quarter to the same quarter of the previous
year. As in the previous specification, the NAWRU estimates are subject to large
fluctuations, and smoothed values are substituted in the production function. For
smoothing the NAWRU series, the HP filter was applied with λ set equal to 100.
The choice of a lower λ was governed by the effort to obtain values that are closer
to raw NAWRU estimates (and underlying wage setting behaviour). The results are
summarised in the Figure 8.
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tTo obtain an estimate of potential output, all that remains is to substitute trend
total factor productivity (TFPPOT), the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment
(NAWRU) and the actual capital stock (K) into the production function. The path of
potential output as compared to actual seasonally adjusted real GDP is plotted in
Figure 9.
The output gap45 was calculated as the deviation of actual GDP from potential
GDP in per cent of potential GDP. A comparison of the output gap and the unem-
ployment gap (NAWRU minus UR) is shown in Figure 10.
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FIGURE 9 Potential Output and Seasonally Adjusted GDP
FIGURE 10 The Output Gap and Unemployment Gap
45 It is necessary to emphasise that the output gap derived in this paper is different from the out-
put gap that has been used in the Czech National Bank for the purposes of inflation forecasts.
While in this paper we have followed closely the OECD methodology for potential output esti-
mation (based on the Cobb-Douglas production function), the CNB’s official model forecasting
apparatus relies on a multivariate filter system (Kalman filter). For more details on the CNB’s




















































































Seasonally adjusted quarterly data were used to estimate all the regression equa-
tions. The estimation period covers 1995:1 to 2002:3, which amounts to 31 obser-
vations. In most cases, the OLS estimator was applied to obtain the parameter va-
lues. In all but a few cases, the DW statistic indicates significant positive serial cor-
relation in theresiduals. This results from theomission of thelag structure, thequar-
terly frequency of the time series, the small sample and from the fact that
the seasonally adjusted data exhibit volatility while the potential values (of output
and employment) are “trend” values of the underlying variables without any major
fluctuations. Except for the output elasticity of employment, no attempt was made
to remove the residual correlation bias. To account for simultaneity in the con-
sumption and import equations, two-stage least squares were applied, with instru-
ments given under the relevant regression equations.
Output Elasticity of Employment
Budget sensitivity with respect to output is very much dependent on the output
elasticity of employment. Both the output elasticity of social security contributions
and the output elasticities of personal income tax and corporate income tax are af-
fected by theemployment-output relationship. At thesame time, these taxes account
for more than two thirds of all tax revenues. On the other hand, a positive relation
between the elasticity of labour taxation (social security contributions, personal in-
come tax) and the output elasticity of employment is in part offset by the negative
relation between the elasticity of capital taxation (corporate income tax) and the out-
put elasticity of employment.
The OLS estimate of the output elasticity of employment (0.243) is biased by po-
sitive serial correlation in the residuals. To check the robustness of the parameter
estimate, a lagged endogenous variable was introduced into the equation, assuming
a geometric lag structure. Using a Koyck transformation, the long-run output elas-
ticity of employment amounts to 0.460 (0.099/(1 – 0.785)). For the purposes of cyc-
lical adjustment, the impact of higher output on employment within a year (i.e. with-
in four quarters) is of crucial importance. Following an increase in output by 1 %,
employment increases by 0.286 % within four quarters.
ln (ZAM_SA/ZAM_POT) = –0.002 + 0.243 . ln(Y_SA/Y_POT)
(–1.94)    (4.45)
R2 = 0.423; DW = 0.756
ln (ZAM_SA/ZAM_POT) =– 0.0003 + 0.099 .ln(Y_SA/Y_POT) +0.785 .ln(ZAM_SA–1/
(–0.63)  (3.48)                           (10.30)
/ZAM_POT–1)
R2 = 0.887; DW = 2.419
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R2 = 0.584; DW = 0.675
Output elasticity of private consumption
ln(CNI_SA/Y_POT) = – 0.682 + 0.003 . TIME + 1.019 . ln(Y_SA/Y_POT)
(–72.38) (6.97)  (4.71)
Instrument list: C, TIME, ln(G_SA/Y_POT), ln(I_SA/Y_POT)
R2 = 0.620; DW = 0.452
Output elasticity of import of goods
ln(IMPG_SA/Y_POT) = –0.964 + 0.023 . TIME + 1.495 . ln(Y_SA/Y_POT)
(–51.54) (29.79)  (3.23)
Instrument list:C ,TIME, ln(CNI_SA/Y_POT), ln(I_SA/Y_POT)
R2 = 0.973; DW = 1.326
Employment elasticity of labour supply
ln(LF_SA/ZAM_POT) = 0.030 + 0.002 . TIME – 0.662 . ln(ZAM_SA/ZAM_POT)
(17.79) (22.41)  (–7.51)
R2 = 0.963; DW = 0.940
∆ln(LF_SA) = 0.0003 + 0.171 . ∆ln(ZAM_SA)
(0.85)     (1.71)
R2 = 0.091; DW = 1.528
List of abbreviations:
Y – real GDP; CNI – real private consumption; G – real government consumption;
I – real gross fixed capital formation; IMPG – import of goods (real); CNIP – nomi-
nal private consumption; ZAM – employment; LF – labour force; W_R – real wage
rate; SA – seasonally adjusted variable; POT – potential level of variable.
The ESCB approach
Seasonally adjusted quarterly data were used to estimate budgetary elasticities.
The data sample covers the period from 1994:1 to 2002:3 – 35 observations in all.
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tax elasticity parameter is significant at 90 % only, and the CIT elasticity with re-
spect to gross operating surplus is not significant at all. The lag specification in
the case of the CIT equation was calibrated. The time trend was employed in all re-
gression equations. The revenue and expenditure fiscal data used in this paper (in
both the OECD and ESCB methods) are reported on a cash basis, since there are
no accrual (ESA95) fiscal quarterly figures/estimates available in the Czech Re-
public.
VAT elasticity on private real consumption
ln(VAT_SA) = –1.250 + 0.770 . ln(C_SA) + 0.017 . TIME
(–0.75)    (2.38)                    (7.03)
R2 = 0.942; DW = 1.318
The elasticity of excise proceeds on private real consumption
ln(EX_SA) = –2.831 + 0.976 . ln(C_SA) + 0.009 . TIME
(–1.069)  (1.893)  (2.489)
R2 = 0.804; DW = 1.548
The elasticity of social security and health care contributions on the private real wage
bill
ln(SSC_SA) = –0.915 + 1.029 . ln(W_SA) + 0.016 . TIME
(–1.48)    (7.42)                      (16.13)
R2 = 0.980; DW = 1.437
The elasticity of corporate income tax on gross operating surplus
ln(CIT) = 0.267 + 0.444 . ln(0.4 . GOSt–1_SA + 0.3 . GOSt–4_SA + 0.15 . GOSt–2_SA
(–0.02) (0.15)   
+ 0.15 . GOSt–3_SA) + 0.012 . TIME
(0.61)
R2 = 0.245; DW = 2.309
The elasticity of unemployment-related benefits on the number of unemployed persons
ln(EXP_SA) = –4.548 + 0.784 . ln(U_SA) + 0.020 . TIME
(–15.24)  (12.84)  (6.63)
R2 = 0.989; DW = 1.781
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The paper considers the impact of the business cycle on Czech fiscal balance in
the past decade. The authors employed two different calculation methods in theier
analysis: an OECD and an ESCB method. Two crucial findings emerged from the ana-
lysis. First, the estimates of cyclically adjusted deficits in the Czech Republic pro-
ved their robustness, because both our calculation methods, although being philo-
sophically different, provided very similar results. Sharply deteriorating Czech bud-
get deficits are basically structural in nature, i.e., they are independent of the bu-
siness cycle. Moreover, another hypothesis was confirmed: Czech fiscal policy exhi-
bits mainly pro-cyclical features. As the paper further documents, both basic as-
sessments held true even when quasi-fiscal deficits were included in the analysis.
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